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Unprotected Identities: Recognizing Cultural 
Ethnic Divergence In Interpreting Title VII's 
'National Origin' Classification 
Eugenio Abellera Cruz* 
Life is what happens while you're making other plans. l 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(a) 
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise 
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.2 
INTRODUCTION 
Karl Marx wrote in 1848 that a specter was haunting Europe-"the 
specter of Communism.,,3 With the end of the Cold War,4 this threat to 
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California Hastings College of the Law. I would like to dedicate this Note to my grandfa-
ther, Eugenio Evangelista Cruz and my mother, Zenaida Abellera Cruz. Special thanks goes 
to Maureen Burke Cobarr, Laura Dawson, and Charmaine Evans for their editorial support. 
I also wish to thank the citecheckers of this Note for their collective effort in bringing this 
work to print: Patty Cho, Janine Schiess, Troye Schaffer and Dina Wong. Special editorial 
thanks goes to Jennifer Applegate. 
1. RENATO ROSALDO, CULTURE & TRUTH: THE REMAKING OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS 91 
(1989). Perhaps this quote summarizes the constricted, static and ultimately underprotective 
paradigm which Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act affords to cultural discrimination. 
Through its overtly narrow focus on geographic origins, federal anti-discrimination law 
makes rigid, narrow statutory "plans" which can neither address nor protect the fluid ever-
changing nature of cultural "life." 
2. 42 U.S.c.§ 2000(e)(2) (West 1995) (emphasis added). 
3. KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (1848), 
reprinted in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 469,473 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 1978). One ex-
ample of the Marxist belief in the overwhelming predominance of class solidarity over eth-
nic affinities is exemplified by the 1986 program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Un-
ion. It states, "the nationalities question inherited from the past has been successfully 
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global political structures may have been superseded, at least for now, by 
another "specter" --ethnic nationalism.5 Stemming from cultural alle-
giances often stronger than class consciousness, ethnic group conflicts 
touch upon every continent of the world.6 Ethnicity is proving to be sur-
prisingly potent in tearing asunder once seemingly invincible and unques-
tionable geopolitical lines. 7 
Most ethnic separatism arises from the maldistribution of political and 
economic capital,8 uneven economic standing,9 and the suppression of 
solved in the Soviet Union." Alfred Erich Senn, Nationality Questions in the Baltic, in 
GLOBAL CONVULSIONS: RACE ETHNICITY, AND RATIONALISM AT THE END OF THE 20TH 
CENTURY 247,248 (Winston Van Home ed., 1997). 
4. For a global overview of ethnic separatism embodied by secessionist trends in the 
former Czechoslovakia, Moldova, South Ossetia, Indonesia and the former Yugoslavia see 
George J. Church, Splinter, Splinter, Little State, TIME, July 6, 1992, at 36 (noting the 
global trend towards "splitting up existing states into smaller ethnic nations, some of which 
then go on to divide amoeba-like into ever small pieces. . .. Allover the world, ethnic 
movements are demanding and frequently getting their own turf."). 
5. See Brian E. Porter, Concepts of Nationalism in History, in GLOBAL CONVULSIONS 
93, 112 (1997). 
No sooner had the idea of the nation-state achieved worldwide currency, 
than a new type of polity founded upon ethnicity, tribalism, and kinship ap-
peared to be struggling to be born. The bloody events in the former Yugo-
slavia, the genocide in Rwanda and the virtual disintegration of other Mri-
can states; the reappearance of a virulent anti-Semitism in Russia ... and the 
fierce demand for the recognition of their identities by hitherto quiescent 
minorities in certain old established nation-states; all these indicate that the 
race is on between ethnicism and state nationalism for the future and the 
soul of the world. . .. Just as the dynastic state gave way to the nation-state, 
are we seeing the birth pangs of a new world order structured less upon na-
tionalism than upon ethnicity? Id. 
6. Examples of recent ethnic-based insurgencies span the globe. In Sri Lanka, seces-
sionist elements of the predominantly Hindu Tamil minority continue to wage a bloody 15 
year armed secessionist struggle against the mostly Buddhist Sinhalese majority. See Don-
ald Smith, Tamil Tigers Turn Sri Lanka Into State of Terror, L.A. TIMES, April 24, 1994, at 
A4. In Russia, among a panoply of ethnic groups agitating for partial or full autonomy, 
Chechnya's armed attempt at secession exacted a particularly bloody toll on both Russians 
and Chechens. See generally Ira Rifkin, Faith is Factor in Driving Chechens, THE SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, January 20, 1996, at AI. ("Two factors keep them fighting, accord-
ing to expatriate Chechens and others familiar with their motivations. The first is a burning 
desire to be free of Moscow's domination, which Chechens have fought for more than two 
centuries. . .. The second factor sustains the first and is deeply rooted in the Chechen relig-
ious soul."). In Burma, the central government was at war with various ethnic groups, in-
cluding the Shan, Karen and Karenni-each ethnic group clamoring for their own inde-
pendent states. See UPI, Burma Rebels Oppose Refugee Repatriation, UPI BC Cycle Press 
Release, June 15, 1995. 
7. From French Quebec to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia to the Tuareges in 
Mali and Niger, ethnic minorities seek either autonomy or complete secession. See Robin 
Wright, The New Tribalism All Over the World, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 13, 1993, at FOI. 
8. "Japanese efforts to oust Sukamo, Papangano-speaking [sic] [peasants' effort] to 
overthrow the Philippine government [and] Portuguese and African efforts to unseat the 
Indian majority in Guyana" exemplify ethnic attempts to employ military mobilization to 
gain a political voice. See Margaret E. Galey, Effects of Ethnic Conflict on National Devel-
opment: A Commentary, in ETHNICITY AND NATION-BUILDING: COMPARATIVE, INTER-
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cultural identity.lO Increasingly, the discourse of "nationhood" has shifted 
focus from political boundaries and hegemony to ethnic boundaries and 
cultural delineation. ll This phenomenon is readily apparent in America's 
changing ethnic and racial composition.12 Given the global power and 
significance of ethnicity, it is imperative that we take into consideration the 
significance of ethnicity in scrutImzmg one of America's13 anti-
discrimination laws-Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 14 
NATIONAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 269, 276 (Wendell Bell & Walter E. Freeman 
eds., 1974). Similarly, the ongoing Sikh military and political agitation for an autonomous 
Sikh state of "Khalistan" derives in part from "the general economic demands of the Jat 
Sikh peasantry for political action to relieve their economic problems." See Paul R. Brass, 
Socio-Economic Aspects of the Punjab Crisis, in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF ETHNIC 
CONFLICT 224, 233 (S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe & Reed Coughlan eds., 1991). 
9. Since ethnic groups often occupy differing layers in a nation-state's economy, eco-
nomic changes often exacerbate tensions and conflict based on cultural differences. One 
example of this dynamic between economic development and ethnic separatism occurred in 
Czechoslovakia. While the Czechs stood to gain the most from radical market reforms due 
to their general skill levels and economic activities, market reform did not benefit Slovaks 
similarly. The Slovaks suffered from market reforms because their economy revolved 
around military and heavy industries incompatible with free market conditions or greater 
foreign markets. This ill-fitting economic arrangement contributed significantly to the break 
up of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia. See supra note 7. More re-
cently, the current downturn in Indonesia's economy prompted riots and other acts of vio-
lence by the Moslem Indonesian majority against the ethnic Chinese minority who figure 
prominently in Indonesia's business sector. See Derwin Pereira, The Day a Town Was 
Torched, THE STRAITS TIMES WORLD Focus, Mar. 30, 1998, at 32. 
10. A dramatic example of armed ethnic hostility fueled by cultural suppression is ex-
emplified by historic Turkish policies regarding its Kurdish minority. See Aryeh Neier, 
Watching Rights, THE NATION, Sept. 17, 1990, at 263 ("In Turkey the increased repression 
of the Kurds after the 1980 military coup, including a strict prohibition on their use of the 
Kurdish language and even on their right to identify themselves as Kurds, spurred Kurdish 
separatists to guerrilla warfare in 1984."). 
11. While the state seeks to incorporate ethnic identities within it through shared experi-
ences (e.g., a common legal system, common foreign enemies, and common economy) this 
imposed commonality often proves inadequate compared to the weight and attraction of 
ethnic identity. Ethnic identity provides a sense of family and historic?.! identity that the 
nation-state often cannot produce. While the state can provide common legal and political 
structures, ethnicity offers often stronger bases for group affinity stemming from a distinc-
tive common religion, historical experience, and, usually, ancestral language. See Porter, 
supra note 5, at 108 (noting how the shared English-Irish experience of World War I could 
not counter ethnic Irish separatist aspirations which culminated in the Easter Rebellion and 
Irish independence). 
12. For example, analysts estimate that by the year 2050, non-Latino whites will com-
prise fifty-three percent of the U.S. population. This ongoing demographic shift will only 
heighten differing communities' exposure to employment discrimination. See Steven A. 
Holmes, Census Sees a Profound Ethnic Shift in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, March 14, 1996, at 
A16 (Census analysts predict that Hispanics will comprise 24.5 percent of the population, 
Blacks, 13.6 percent and Asians with 8.2 percent). 
13. The use of "America" in this text refers to the United States. The author acknowl-
edges that the use of this term, though common, is erroneous. 
14. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,78 Stat. 241 [codified at 28 U.S.c. § 
1447,42 U.S.c. §§ 1971, 1975(a) to 1975(d), 2000(a) to 2000(h)(6) (1994)]. Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of "race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000(e)(2)(a)(l) (1994). 
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Title VII does little to remedy discrimination based on intraethnic and 
intracultural differences. Current interpretation of Title VII accords pro-
tection under the rubric of "national origin," (the nation of one's birth or 
ancestry). Strictly speaking, "national origin," under both the "plain 
meaning" of the statute and broader interpretation, focuses on geographic 
ancestry or place of birth. IS However, to interpret national origin on a 
solely geographic basis is to ignore the reality of ethnicity-which can en-
compass race, religion, language, culture and other characteristics in for-
mation of personal and group identity. Protecting an individual's cultural 
and ethnic identity has less to do with protecting their ties to specific geo-
graphic spaces than with protecting their position within a specific cultural 
space. The current definition of "national origin" thus falls short in situa-
tions in which both job applicants, or both applicants and employer come 
from the same geographic space and ethnicity but do not share the same 
cultural space. 
The weakness in Title VII's current "national origin" approach is that 
its strictly geographic orientation produces an implicit conception of cul-
ture as something that is static and monolithic. 16 Yet it is unrealistic to as-
sume that any two people coming from the same country, geographic area, 
ancestry, or even ethnicity will share the same culture. To do so is to ig-
nore the fact that even the most seemingly homogeneous ethnic grouping 
contains cultural subgroups. This current approach ignores culture's het-
erogeneous and fluid nature. Thus, Title VII does not recognize that these 
intraethnic cultural distinctions often result in prejudice, discrimination, 
ethnic segregation and even attempts at ethnocide. 17 
One recent proposal argues that Title VII's term "national origin" is a 
shallow, if not meaningless, construct and should be expanded to include 
the more specific term "ethnic traits.,,18 This argument posits that 
"national origin" discrimination is borne less by an antipathy against one's 
place of birth but against one's ethnicity through one's ethnic traits. In-
deed, "national origin" merely relates to a quality that is not readily per-
ceptible--one cannot tell the place of an individual's birth or ancestry by 
sight. 19 The reality of prejudice, however, is that most discrimination af-
15. The term "national origin" on its face refers to the country where a person was born, 
or, more broadly, the country from which his or her ancestors came. Espinoza v. Farah 
Manufacturing Co., 414 U.S. 86,88 (1973). 
16. "Such a perspective ignores the manner in which culture is relational and fluid-
namely, that we do not live in 'hermetically sealed cultures' that travel with us from cradle 
to grave." Leti Volpp, Talking "Culture": Gender, Race, Nation and the Politics of Mul-
ticulturalism, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1573, 1589 (1996), citing ROSALDO, supra note 1, at 44. 
17. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of Luba and 
Sierra Leone Creole ethnic identity in reaction to European colonialism). 
18. Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating "National Origin" Discrimi-
nation under Title VI/, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 860 (1994). 
19. "Most of the discrimination faced by ethnic minorities is based on their perceptible 
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fixes on perceptible differences or ethnic traits.2o Thus, "the 'national ori-
gin' term does not, and cannot, correctly encompass the protection of traits 
or ethnicity ... [nor is it] helpful in describing accurately or recognizing 
the kind of discrimination that should be prohibited under Title VII."21 
Accordingly, "Congress should add terms protecting against discrimination 
based on 'ancestry' and 'ethnic traits. ",22 
Building on the foregoing critique, this Note posits that the current 
"national origin" protective scheme likewise fails to protect against intra-
ethnic cultural discrimination because it is theoretically oblivious to the 
inherently dynamic, ever changing and ultimately political, nature of eth-
nicity. The current scheme's inadequacy stems from two distinct but inter-
related bases: a strictly geographic orientation in determining "ancestry" 
and "nation" and an assumptive "one ethnicity-one culture" model. Part I 
discusses the definition of culture, its interplay with ethnicity, and the 
definitional problem of ethnicity as a contested site of political, social, 
economic and "primordial" discourses. Part II explores the current na-
tional origin standard Title VII employs and analyzes its twin theoretical 
stances-a geography-based analysis and a monocultural orientation of 
ethnicity. Part III discusses the limitations a geographic and monocultural 
approach suffers in attempting to protect against cultural discrimination. 
Finally, part IV proposes a revised interpretive guideline derived from ex-
isting case law analyses. This final section also discusses the policy ra-
tionales arguing for a revised interpretive standard. 
I. "CULTURE," "ETHNICITY" AND INTRAETHNIC CULTURAL 
DIVERGENCE 
A. Defining "Culture" and "Ethnicity" 
Culture permeates all aspects of human expressive and emotional life 
ranging from the construal of the "Self,23 to the perception24 and labeling 
traits, and not on place of birth. Title VII's focus on 'national origin,' therefore, is not ade-
quate to address the problem of discrimination because of ethnic traits." [d. See also Ste-
phen M. Cutler, Note: A Trait-Based Approach to National Origin Claims Under Title VII, 
94 YALE L. J. 1164, 1165 (1985) ("Differences in dress, language, accent, and custom asso-
ciated with a non-American origin are more likely to elicit prejudicial attitudes than the fact 
of the origin itself.") . 
20. See Perea, supra note 18, at 839, citing JOE R. FEAGIN, RACIAL AND ETHNIC RE-
LA TIONS 8 (3rd ed. 1989) ("Since the distinctive physical characteristics of subordinate ra-
cial groups are assumed to be linked to intellectual or cultural characteristics, dominant 
groups regularly mix their racial definitions with notions about intelligence and cultural 
distincti veness.") . 
21. See Perea, supra note 18, at 839. 
22. Id. at 860 (in addition, "ethnic traits" is to be defined in 42 USC § 2000(e)(0) as in-
cluding, but not limited to "language, accent, surname, and ethnic appearance."). 
23. See David Matsumoto, Introduction, PEOPLE: PSYCHOLOGY FROM A CULTURAL 
PERSPECTIVE 32 (David Matsumoto ed., 1994) [hereinafter PEOPLE]. 
24. See David Matsumoto, Emotion, in PEOPLE, supra note 23, at 117, 125, citing Ek-
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of emotion2S to the expression26 of and reaction to abnormal psychology.27 
Similarly, skill development28 and even the definition of "intelligence,,29 
varies from culture to culture. As defined by noted anthropologist Alfred 
Kroeber, "culture" includes: 
[S]peech, knowledge, beliefs, customs, arts and technologies, ide-
als and rules. That, in short, is what we learn from other men, 
from our elders or the past, plus what we may add to it. . .. Cul-
ture might be defined as all the activities and non-physiological 
products of human personalities that are not automatically reflex 
or instinctive.30 
man et aI., Universal and Cultural Differences in the Judgment of Facial Expressions of 
Emotion, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 53, 712-17 (1987) (noting that although 
most of the test subjects from ten different cultural groups agreed in labeling particular 
emotions, the groups differed in their perception of the degree or intensity of these emo-
tions.). 
25. See Matsumoto, supra note 24, at 125. 
Cultures generally agree on which emotions are being displayed in a facial 
expression, but there is some variability in the level of agreement. For ex-
ample, even though most of the subjects in Indonesia, Japan, France, Brazil, 
and the U.S. may agree that a face expresses a certain emotion ... there will 
be some differences across the cultures in how many subjects in each culture 
agree that expression [depicts the particular emotion]. Id. 
26. See David Matsumoto & Dawn Terrell, Abnormal Psychology, in PEOPLE, supra note 
23, at 135, 139. Symptom manifestation often recapitulates cultural emphasis on particular 
values. For example, schizophrenic patients in the U.S. were less likely to display lack of 
insight and auditory hallucinations than were Danish or Nigerian patients. Perhaps this is 
due to the fact that insight and self-awareness are highly regarded values in the U.S. as op-
posed to other countries. 
27. See id. at 136-38. For instance, behavior which one culture may interpret as schizo-
phrenia or psychosis may be interpreted in another culture as speaking in tongues or spiri-
tual channeling. 
28. Noted psychologist Jean Piaget assigned age ranges in which certain learning stages 
occur. While the learning stages are quite universal-the ascribed age ranges differ. See 
David Matsumoto & Philip Hull, Cognitive Development and Intelligence, in PEOPLE, su-
pra note 23, at 101, 102-05, citing P.R. Dasen, Concrete Operational Development in Three 
Cultures, J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 6, 156-72 (1975). These differences are due to 
differing levels of cultural values placed on particular skills-while nomads are good in 
learning spatial skills, settled tribal societies are good with liquid displacement due to task 
of fetching water. Thus, "[t]he skills that these children use in their everyday lives seem to 
have affected the order in which they were able to solve Piagetian tasks within the concrete 
operations stage." Id. 
29. Many languages possess no word that corresponds to Western ideas of intelligence. 
See Matsumoto & Hull, supra note 28, at 109. Even with cultures that do have definitions 
for Intelligence-there is a difference. The closest Mandarin equivalent, for example, is a 
Chinese character that means "good brain" and "talented." Chinese people often associate 
this with traits such as imitation, effort, and social responsibility. Such traits do not consti-
tute important elements of intelligence for most mainstream Americans-who tend to focus 
more on creativity. Moreover, "[h]ow anyone culture may define what is intelligent may 
not be the same as how another culture defines intelligence. For this reason, the signs or 
behaviors that one can typically use to measure intelligence will differ among cultures." Id. 
30. ALFRED KROEBER, ANTHROPOLOGY: RACE, LANGUAGE, CULTURE, PSYCHOLOGY, 
PREHISTORY 253 (rev. ed. 1948). 
& 
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Thus, culture can be framed as a sociopsychological construct-a 
sharing across people of psychological phenomena such as values, atti-
tudes, beliefs and behaviors.31 Members of the same culture share these 
psychological phenomena. Members of different cultures may not. 32 
Hence, culture can be viewed as the combination of both the "mental prod-
ucts" of a discrete group of people and their attitudes and interpersonal re-
lations or a "total way of life. ,,33 As Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky posit, 
it is possible to look at a total cultural "way of life" as a combination of 
cultural bias and social relations.34 While cultural bias refers to shared 
values and beliefs, the term social relations involves a particular popula-
tion group's patterns of interpersonal relations and attitudes?5 
Nevertheless, culture is not static or stereotypic among people occupy-
ing the same geographic location/or same "ethnicity.,,36 In this sense, as 
psychologist David Matsumoto argues, 
[c]ulture is as much an individual, psychological construct as it is a 
macro, social construct. . " That is, to some extent, culture exists 
in each and every one of us individually as much as it exists as a 
global, social construct. Individual differences in culture can be 
observed among people in the degree to which they adopt and en-
gage in the attitudes, values, beliefs, and behaviors that, by con-
sensus, constitute their culture. If you act in accordance with cer-
tain shared values or behaviors, then that culture resides in you; if 
you do not share those values or behaviors, then you do not share 
that culture. 37 
Culture gains meaning from the presence of different ways of life co-
existing within a seemingly uniform social space-it is always changing 
and subject to contesting views within its cOrpUS. 38 Societies may be 
31. See Matsumoto, supra note 23, at 32. See also ROSALDO, supra note 1, at 26 
("Culture lends significance to human experience by selecting from and organizing it. It 
refers broadly to the forms through which people make sense of their lives. . .. From the 
pirouettes of classical ballet to the most brute of brute facts, all human conduct is culturally 
mediated. Culture encompasses the everyday and the esoteric, the mundane and the ele-
vated, the ridiculous and the sublime. . .. [C]ulture is all-pervasive."). 
32. See Matsumoto, supra note 23, at 4. 
33. For a general discussion on this dichotomy see THOMPSON ET AL., CULTURAL THEORY 
(1990). 
34. /d. 
35. See id. at 4. 
36. There is ample and growing evidence to suggest that a small but substantial portion 
of the population of many different countries do not "match" the dominant cultural stereo-
type of their country. See Matsumoto, supra note 23, at 4. 
37. Id. 
38. See Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and The "Cultural Defense" 
17 HARv. WOMEN'S L.l. 57, 72 (1994), citing Stuart Hall, Cultural Identity and Diaspora, in 
IDENTITY, COMMUNITY CULTURE, DIFFERENCE 222, 225 (Jonathan Rutherford ed., 1990) 
(noting that culture is a dialectical construct-susceptible and responsive to both external 
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constituted so as to countenance certain ways of life and to discourage oth-
ers.39 Ways of life which distinguish one population group from another 
are possible only if other internally competing alternative ways of life are 
left in a contested state.40 
Hence, culture is a relative construction which gains its meaning from 
the internal dialectics of other alternative ways of life present within a 
seemingly unitary culture. These internal dialectics often result in new 
cultural formations or fissures depending on external factors affecting a 
particular group's dominant way of life.41 This interplay between internal 
cultural perception and external influences fuels the dynamics of ethnic 
identity. 
B. Ethnicity and Culture: "Primordial" Identity as Historical and 
Political Vehicle 
Ethnicity can be generally defined in one of two ways: as a product of 
a "primordial" identity or as a form of social organization that functions as 
a vehicle for furthering a particular group's common interests.42 
The "primordial" view of ethnicity posits that ethnicity is a bond de-
rived from a cultural interpretation of both genealogical and non-
genealogical descent among a certain group of people.43 The use of de-
scent as a focal point of cultural interpretation and solidarity arises from 
the universal tendency of humans to select in favor of their kin.44 Such 
recognition of shared descent, while inherently a biological concept, is 
predicated upon the cultural interpretation of what characteristics indicate 
that others belong to the same people as oneself.45 Ethnicity implicates the 
shared mutable and immutable qualities given at birth such as race, na-
tional origin, ancestry, mother language, religion, shared history, tradi-
tions, values, and symbols, all of which contribute to a sense of distinct-
iveness both for members of the group and for outsiders.46 
and internal stimuli). 
39. THOMSPSON ET AL., supra note 33, at 4. 
40. See id. 
41. Illustrated below. Infra notes 76-83 and accompanying text discuss ethnic evolution 
in the face of colonial manipulation and intervention. 
42. See Charles F. Keyes, The Dialectics of Ethnic Change, ETHNIC CHANGE 4, 4 
(Charles F. Keyes ed., 1981) [hereinafter ETHNIC CHANGE] (observing that theories on the 
nature of ethnicity fall into two major camps: one "conceives of ethnicity primarily as im-
plying a cultural heritage shared by a group" and a competing view frames ethnicity as "a 
form of social organization that functions to achieve certain common ends of a group of 
people."). 
43. See, e.g., id. at 5. 
44. See id. 
45. See id. ("Thus, while ethnicity may rest on a universal predilection of humans to se-
lect positively in favor of their own kinsmen, it also is variable because of the diverse cul-
tural meanings that people in different historical circumstances have drawn upon in inter-
preting and in action upon this predilection."). Id. 
46. See id. "[P]rimordial attachments between people [stem from biological and social 
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Another view of ethnicity constructs "ethnicity" as purely a "social 
vessel" in the "struggle for material goods and status. ,,47 In this view, an 
"ethnic group" is primarily a social organization in which the participants 
make use of certain cultural traits from their past, a past which mayor may 
not be verifiable.48 Accordingly, "it is sufficient that a social border be 
drawn between itself and similar groups by means of a few cultural em-
blems and values that make it different in its own eyes and in the eyes of 
others.,,49 Indeed, certain physical or cultural traits,50 no matter how 
slightly different or superficial from similar characteristics possessed by 
other groups, become rallying points for group affinity. This affinity is 
then employed as a common cause to press for the group's demands.51 In 
sum, "ethnicity" denotes not a fixed unchangeable characteristic but a ma-
nipulation of cultural tradition for politicoeconomic ends.52 
The two views regarding the nature of ethnicity may not be logically 
inconsistent-they may actually complement each other.53 While ethnicity 
can be conceived as initially built around bonds derived from biological 
phenomenon] subject to cultural elaboration [which include] sex, locality and time of birth, 
physiological features that are recognized as marks of biological inheritance, and social de-
scent or links with forebears. Ethnicity ... derives from a cultural interpretation of de-
scent." /d. With regard to group history, such history does not necessarily have to be his-
torically "accurate." History's purpose, in the "primordial" ethnic sense, is to serve as a 
reference for ethnic pride and source of identity. See id. ("What cultural characteristics are 
marked as emblematic of ethnic identity depends upon the interpretations of the experiences 
and actions of mythical ancestors and/or historical forebears. These interpretations are often 
presented in the form of myths or legends in which historical events have been accorded 
symbolic significance."). Id. 
47. EUGEEN E. ROOSENS, CREATING ETHNICITY: THE PROCESS OF ETHNOGENESIS 13 
(1989) ("[E]thnic self-affirmation or the ignoring or minimization of ethic identity is always 
related in one way or another way to the defense of social or economic interests. Many 
people change their ethnic identity only if they can profit by doing so."). See also Reed 
Coughlan & S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe, Introduction, ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF ETHNIC 
CONFLICT 3-13 (S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe & Reed Coughlan eds., 1991) (discussing an 
economic explanation for ethnic group antagonism). 
48. According to this view, "[t]he ethnic 'past' is always a subjective reconstruction." 
See EUGEEN E. ROOSENS, supra note 47, at 17. 
49. Id. at 12. 
50. According to Roosens, "the term 'ethnic identity' can refer to origin, uniqueness, 
passing on of life, 'blood,' solidarity, unity, security, personal integrity, independence, rec-
ognition, equality, cultural uniqueness, respect, equal economic rights, territorial integrity, 
and so on, and these in all possible combinations, degrees of emotional content, and forms 
of social organization." Id. at 19. 
51. "Any aspect or cultural trait, no matter how superficial, can serve as a starting point 
for the familiar tendency to monopolistic closure. . .. Almost any kind of similarity or con-
trast of physical type and of habits can induce the belief that a tribal affinity or disaffinity 
exists between groups that attract or repel each other." Max Weber, Ethnic Groups, in 
THEORIES OF SOCIETY VOL. 1 (Talcott Parsons, et al. eds., 1961), cited in Martin E. Marty, 
Cultural Foundations of Ethnonationalism, in GLOBAL CONVULSIONS 115-16 (Winston Van 
Horn ed., 1997). 
52. See Abner Cohen, Variables in Ethnicity, in ETHNIC CHANGE, supra note 43, at 309. 
53. Charles F. Keyes' framework of 'ethnic dialectics' track the overlap of 
"primordialist" and "social vessel" schools of thought. See Keyes, supra note 42, at 4. 
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descent, the attitudes and myths surrounding these biological truths and 
physical similarities are often colored and shaped by the insular cultural 
group's external social, political and material concerns. Hence, group 
conceptions about shared similarities in the form of group mythology and 
self-conception are prone to historic change, manipulations and interven-
tions.54 As anthropologist Stuart Hall observes: 
Cultural identities come from somewhere, have histories. But, 
like everything which is historical, they undergo constant trans-
formation. Far from being eternally fixed in some essentialized 
past, they are subject to the continuous "play" of history, culture, 
and power. Far from being grounded in a mere "recovery" of the 
past, which is waiting to be found, and which, when found, will 
secure our sense of ourselves into eternity, identities are the names 
we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position 
ourselves within, the narratives of the past. 55 
Given this "call and response" relationship with external factors, eth-
nic identity is often created, modified and destroyed. It is created through 
. . 1 56 .. 57 1·· 58 mtergroup nva ry, state resource competItIon, or state po lCles. 
Moreover, shared historical experiences serve to modify formerly distinct 
and established ethnic identities 59 or encourage rallying around ethnic 
identities for political purposes.60 Conversely, ethnicity can be destroyed 
54. See Porter, supra note 5, at 109. 
Some ofthe beliefs an [ethnic group] holds about itself may be derived more 
from myth than reality: the idea of the Founder of the People, a Father Abra-
ham or an Aeneas, or the claim, made for the Romans, and for the medieval 
Celtic British, of descent from fugitives from Troy. Myth, in fact, not only 
plays an essential part in group identity, but is continuously created to pre-
serve and enhance that identity ... the ongoing mythologizing of history can 
produce a psychological unity of fearsome potency. (Emphasis added). 
55. Hall, supra note 38, at 222, (emphasis added), as cited in Volpp, supra note 38, at 72. 
56. Ethnic conflict and rivalry are "bound to sharpen the cultural differences between 
groups and to develop corporate organization in each in order to conduct the struggle effec-
tively." Cohen, supra note 52, at 317-18 ("When we talk of ethnic groups, we are by defini-
tion talking about groups in interaction with other groups .... "). 
57. See Coughlan & Samarasinghe, supra note 47, at 3. 
58. Often, the "context in which ethnicity and ethnic identity is located is one of conflict 
or tension with the state." Martin Diskin, Revolution and Ethnic Identity, in CONFLICT, 
MIGRATION AND THE EXPRESSION OF ETHNICITY 26 (Nancie L. Gonzales & Carolyn S. 
McCommon eds., 1989). This political tension provides the motivation for the constant 
definition of group identity. Id. 
59. See, e.g., Roach v. Dresser, 494 F. Supp. 215 (W.D. La. 1980) (noting how an 
"Acadian" identity was forged from earlier Scottish, French and English identities due to 
their shared collective experience of exile from Acadia (modem Nova Scotia». 
60. The pursuit of political agendas leads to the manipulation of cultural difference to 
enhance ethnic divergence as witnessed by the U.S. funding of Miskito Indians' independ-
ence struggle in Central America to further U.S. geopolitical strategies against Nicaraguan 
Sandinista influence. See Diskin, supra note 58, at 15. 
• 
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through genocide61 and acculturation/assimilation.62 "Ethnicity can be old, 
or quite young. Rather, it is timeless, or of all times.,,63 
C. Intraethnic Cultural Fission: The Birth of Nations 
Just as ethnic groups evolve through interaction with other distinct 
ethnicities, ethnic groups also change because of internal cultural sub-
groupings. In a sense, ethnicity serves as the forum in which cultural dia-
lectics interact, not merely between the ethnic group and outsiders, but also 
within the group itself. 
Intraethnic culture is not homogenous.64 There are many differences to 
61. The latest example being in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although the roots of Moslem-
Christian and Serbo-Croatian animosity date back centuries, much of the current attempts at 
genocide-"ethnic cleansing"-can be traced to the 1940s when the Nazi-controlled Croa-
tian government attempted to destroy its Serb population. See Thomas M. Franck, Clan and 
Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in Law and Practice, 90 A. J. 1. L. 359, 368 
(1996). 
62. This goes to the core of the distinction of the group. A group's shared sense of his-
tory, symbols, beliefs and expression form the glue that binds the group identity into a co-
hesive whole. Their wholesale relinquishment and replacement with a differing set of cul-
tural values effectively destroys the core "difference" inherent in that ethnic group. The 
American government, for a time, embarked on a policy of systematic destruction of Native 
American culture through assimilation as witnessed through its statutes and policies. See 
FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 242-43 (1983). One of the more ne-
farious schemes involved the government's dispensing of alcohol to Native Americans who 
could "prove" assimilation. See Robert J. Miller & Maril Hazlett, The "Drunken Indian": 
Myth Distilled into Reality Through Federal Indian Alcohol Policy, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 223, 
258 (1996) ("In line with the assimilation logic of destroying native cultural identities, some 
states allowed Indians to drink alcohol if their tribal/ward relationship with the guard-
ian/federal government had ceased, and the Indian could prove that he or she was 
'civilized. "'). Nor was the systemic pursuit of the destruction of existing ethnic identity 
through assimilation confined to the United States. For an example of European colonial-
ism's effect on African economic development see Theophilus Fuseini Maranga, The Colo-
nial Legacy and the African Common Market: Problems and Challenges Facing the Afri-
can Economic Community, 10 HARv. BLACKLETIER J. 105, 115 (1993) ("In French Africa, 
the policy of 'assimilation' was meant to transform the 'natives' so that the language, cul-
ture and social values of the French would be imbibed by these 'natives.' There was a de-
liberate policy to transform the Africans from their 'barbaric' ways of life into a more 
'civilized' French culture."). For an example of contemporary Chinese attempts at cultural 
annihilation, see Michele L. Radin, The Right to Development as a Mechanism for Group 
Autonomy: Protection of Tibetan Cultural Rights, 68 WASH. L. REV. 695,711-12 (1993) 
("[The Tibetans] have resisted China's express policies of assimilation and cultural destruc-
tion, most notably by retaining a strong Buddhist culture."). It has been suggested that cur-
rent Chinese attempts at assimilating Tibetan culture mirrors earlier Chinese cultural poli-
cies with outlying Inner Asian steppe "barbaric" peoples who invaded and ruled China. "As 
these people (steppe nomads) were ethnically different from the Chinese they were progres-
sively submerged in Chinese culture and this ideology of cultural imperialism became part 
of Chinese national identity." TIBETAN YOUNG BUDDHISTS ASSOCIATION, TIBET: THE FACTS 
218,218 (1984). 
63. ROOSENS, supra note 47, at 117. 
64. See, e.g., Keyes, supra note 42, at 7 ("A culturally homogenous group of people that 
is isolated from other groups can be internally divided into descent groups .... "). See also 
Cutler, supra note 19, at 1164 (Focusing mostly on the differing levels of cultural assimila-
tion within ethnic groupings as the primary measure of 'cultural heterogeneity') . 
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which the individual "Selfs," "in group," can attach. 65 Differing dress, 
histories,66 differing clans,67 tribes, dialects,68 geographic origins within the 
same "homeland," sensibilities, cultural predisposition and values69 may be 
"markers" upon which internal divisions can be based. Thus, individuals 
may receive different treatment because they possess perceptible traits or 
qualities that set them apart from those evaluating them despite the fact 
that they are both from the same geographic region, race or ethnic group. 
Intra-ethnic discrimination arises when arbitrary differential values are 
imposed on a sub-group's perceptible (or readily discoverable) traits?O 
65. For the mechanism inherent in discrimination both the interethnic and intraethnic 
context, see Hesburgh, Foreword, in PREJUDICE USA i, vi (C. Glock & E. Siegelman eds., 
1969) ("Prejudice begins because of a perception of difference--difference of color, lan-
guage, religion, social or economic situation, physical appearance, even sex. We follow this 
perception of difference with an evaluation and a comparison: What we have or are is the 
best, so anything different must be inferior.") (Emphasis added). 
66. A particular intraethnic cultural "pecking order" may be the product of a recapitula-
tion and reconstruction of the colonial hierarchies back in the home country. European co-
lonial powers often pitted one ethnic subgroup against another to maintain control. For 
military and economic control to take hold there must be internal controls due to the inade-
quacy of colonial police/military force. Hence, a process of cultural internalization of co-
lonial-imposed notions of Western supremacy. See Cohen, supra note 52, at 310-15 
(exploring the historic transformation of Sierra Leone's Creoles from an intraethnic "status" 
group to self-consciously distinct ethnic group). For a generalized example, see James Fal-
lows, A Damaged Culture, THE ATLANTIC, November 1987 (detailing the impact of colo-
nialism on Filipino notions of "nationhood" and cultural identity). See generally KWAME 
NKRUMAH, NEO-COLONIALISM, THE LAST STAGE OF IMPERIALISM (1966) (examining the im-
pact of historic British domination of African economies and education systems and the use 
of these systems to pursue imperial goals). 
67. A clan is an extended identity based on kinship ties. For a Native American exam-
ples see EDWARD P. DOZIER, THE PUEBLO INDIANS OF NORTH AMERICA 213 (1970) ("[C]lan 
is defined as a unilineal descent group ... , traced through the mother's side"), and FRED 
EGGAN, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE WESTERN PUEBLOS 300-01 (1950) (detailing clan or-
ganization). 
68. J.A. Fishman, Language and Ethnicity, in LANGUAGE, ETHNICITY AND INTERGROUP 
RELATIONS 15, 25 (Howard Giles ed., 1977). 
By its very nature language is the quintessential symbol. . .. [I]n the proc-
ess of symbolizing it tends also to become valued in itself. . .. Language is 
the recorder of paternity, the expresser of patrimony and the carrier of phe-
nomenology. Any vehicle carrying such precious freight, indeed, as pre-
cious in and of itself. . .. Anything can become symbolic of ethnicity ... 
but since language is the prime symbol system to begin with and since it is 
commonly relied upon so heavily (even if not exclusively) to enact, celebrate 
and 'call forth' all ethnic activity, the likelihood that it will be recognized 
and singled out as symbolic of ethnicity is great indeed. [d. 
69. The repertoire of identity symbols and signifiers, "cultural diactrica," include 
"language, religion, rituals, dress style, or dietary preferences that members look for and 
exhibit to show identity-and the underlying values, codes of ethics, or standards of moral-
ity shared by group members." JANET T. LANDA, TRUST, ETHNICITY, AND IDENTITY: 
BEYOND THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF ETHNIC TRADING NETWORKS, CONTRACT 
LAW, AND GIFT-EXCHANGE 16-17 (1994). 
70. Thus, intraethnic groupings might separate themselves from each other based on per-
ceived differences that ethnic groups use to set up ethnic boundaries. See Fishman, supra 
note 68, at 15, 25 (anything can become symbolic of ethnicity-whether food, dress, shelter, 
-eM 6MB' W' &&i.-a 
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These differences are assigned cultural meanings that correlate to such 
conditions as economic subordination, power and social status.7l These 
boundaries and cultural delineations are most palpable in the specific na-
tional contexts in which they are practiced. 72 
Intraethnic cultural divisions can easily form the bedrock for cultural 
fissures and ethnic conflict which result in the birth of new ethnic groups 
ethnic conflict. 73 European colonial policies provide stark examples of 
how intraethnic cultural differences were exploited or generated74 to pro-
land tenure, artifacts, work, patterns of worship). 
71. A dramatic example of this stereotype ascription process involves the tragic history of 
the Hutus and the Tutsis. Although both groups historically were within the same cultural 
grouping, colonial exacerbation ossified formerly flexible status lines. The "Hutu" status, 
during pre-colonial times, involved agricultural and manual labor whereas the "Tutsi" status 
meant warrior class membership. These status lines were, up to pre-colonial times, perme-
able and varies according to an individual's fortunes. However, the Belgian imperialists 
fixed status differences based on stature and appearance. Belgian colonialism stereotyped 
tallness as being a mark of Tutsi ethnic origin. A whole panoply of colonially imposed val-
ues accompanied this physical division: "tall" meant "Tutsi" which meant "superior" with 
the opposite applying to the supposedly shorter "Hutu." See Alain Destexhe, The Third 
Genocide; Rwanda, FOREIGN POL'Y No. 97, December 22, 1994, at 3. 
All Rwandans speak one language and share a single culture as well as 
obeying the same ruler. The line between Hutu and Tutsi is flexible: rich 
Hutu can become Tutsi, Tutsi who lose power and wealth become Hutu. 
Mistakenly believing the Tutsi to be different from and superior to the Hutu, 
the Belgians reserve higher education and positions of power for this elite. 
They establish a system of population registration that sets apart those de-
fined as Tutsi ... from the mass of Hutu. 
Alison Des Forges, Chronology, in THE SILENCE 1. See also, ROOSENS, supra note 47, at 13 
"[T]he isolated, culturally homogenous tribe or ethnic unit was often the creation of ... 
ethnographers or ethnologists who wanted to situate the "tribes" of a region conveniently on 
a map." Id. 
72. Accordingly, notions of Hindu caste identity and separation are strongest in India. 
Notions of Filipino provincial differences are strongest in the Philippines. 
73. "One attempt to count the 'ethnic/cultural fatalities' in such clashes between 1945 
and 1967 listed thirty-four 'major' bloodletting and hundreds of lesser collisions and came 
up with an estimated total of 7,480,000 deaths." H. ISAACS, IDOLS OF THE TRIBE: GROUP 
IDENTITY AND POLITICAL CHANGE 3 (1975). Regarding ethnic genesis, two products of cul-
tural differentiation borne from intraethnic schisms are Americans and Cajuns. Americans 
were viewed as "new" men uniquely born of the American experiment which eradicated 
differences of religion, custom and manners to achieve a relatively homogenous society. 
See ST. JOHN DE CREVECOEUR, LEITERS FROM AN AMERICAN FARMER 49, 54-59 (1968). 
Perhaps this assessment pertained only to white ethnic Americans. Americans of color his-
torically had to survive segregation, lynching, immigration exclusions, and systemic dis-
crimination to become "new persons" in the multicultural discourse which is of recent vin-
tage yet already under excruciating attack. Cajuns originally consisted of French nationals 
residing in French Acadia, Spanish and Anglo-Saxon antecedents. The shared historical 
experience of mass exile from Acadia forged these prior differing ethnic and cultural groups 
into a new cultural body. See, e.g., Roach v. Dresser, 494 F. Supp. 215, 217 (W.D. La. 
1980). 
74. A stark example of this "divide and conquer" strategy can be found in the words of 
Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, the Spanish expeditionary leader who succeeded in colonizing 
the Philippines: 
I believe that the natives could be easily subdued by good treatment and the 
174 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:2 
duce distinct ethnic groupings thereafter locked in rivalry and ethnocide. 75 
In the Kasai region of Zaire, recently renamed the Congo, an ethnic differ-
entiation between the Luba and Luluwa tribes was created through Belgian 
colonial allocation of colonial administrative positions and economic 
policies.76 Prior to the Belgians' arrival, there was no hard and fast dis-
tinction between a "Luba" and a "Luluwa" since each group saw itself as 
related to the other or as sharing a political lord-vassal relationship.77 In-
deed, both groups considered themselves "Luba" albeit of differing clans.78 
Yet the Belgian colonial scheme favored Lubas with regards to colonial 
administration; thus, Lubas occupied the most advanced colonial adminis-
trative posts as compared to other cultural groups in Zaire.79 As a result of 
this colonial experience, Lubas formed the educated and cosmopolitan elite 
of Zaire. 80 While conceptualized as a socioeconomic status label, "Luba" 
status hardened into an ethnic identity recognized by both Luba and non-
Luba. Lubas are stereotyped as hard workers and as a forward-looking, 
. 1 81 progressIve peop e. 
Therefore, status as a member of the Lubas originated as a clan differ-
entiation, became a socioeconomic status label, and eventually evolved 
into an ethnic identity that was recognized by both Lubas and non-Lubas. 
Proof of the change of "Luba" status into a distinct ethnic identity can be 
seen in the political rivalry between the two groups culminating in the 
display of kindness, for they have no leaders, and are so divided among 
themselves and have so little dealing with one another-never assembling to 
gain strength, or rendering obedience to one another. If some of them refuse 
at first to make peace with us, afterwards, on seeing how well we treat those 
who have already accepted our friendship, they are induced to do the same. 
But if we undertake to subdue them by force of arms, and make war on 
them, they will perish .... 
Legazpi, quoted in MIGUEL BERNAD: TRADITION & DISCONTINUITY: ESSAYS ON PHILIPPINE 
HISTORY AND CULTURE 45-46 (1983). Because of this fragmentation, the people of one re-
gion could be pitted against those of another. Early colonization of the Philippines by 
Spaniards was achieved through the aid of native warriors from other regions of the country. 
Indeed, insurrections in one region were routinely put down with Military sources from 
other regions. This fragmentation arose from the fact that "each [Filipino] village was sepa-
rate, independent. . .. [Filipino] society was structured into a large kingdom with extensive 
territories, like Majapahit or Angkor or the Chinese Empire." [d. 
75. It has been argued that whole ethnic groupings, at least in sub-Saharan Africa, are the 
product not so much of primitive or ancient identities but of European missionaries. See 
ROOSENS, supra note 47, at 117. 
76. Seeid.at117-18. 
77. See id. at 117. 
78. See id. at 122. 
79. See id. at 118. 
80. See id. at 118. 
81. See id. at 122 (in a study of cultural stereotypes shared by both Lubas and of others' 
perception of the Lubas, the Luba ethnic group is described as inventive, creative, idealistic, 
seekers, scholars, organizers, politicians, all-knowing, persevering, hard working, clever, 
athletic, productive, dynamic and rich). 
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wholesale massacre and expulsion of Luba by the Luluwas in 1959.82 
Luba ethnic distinction finally crystallized when, in the face of expulsion 
and massacres, Luba leaders prepared for a mass exodus to an agreed Luba 
home territory within Zaire. 83 
The tendency of colonialism to transform status identities into crucial 
ethnic distinctions also had effect in other places, such as 
RwandalBurundi84 and Sierra Leone.85 Exile is also a powerful tool used 
to create ethnic distinctions-exile and the generally hostile reception af-
forded Palestinian refugees in Lebanon has resulted in a growing definition 
of "Palestinian" as a cultural ethnicity rather than as a mere "nationalist 
ideological framework.,,86 Similarly, resource competition and struggle for 
control over resource exploitation and export from post-Soviet Russia pro-
duced the Talysh-Mugan Autonomous Republic comprised of the Farsi-
speaking Talysh minority of Azerbaijan-a group once thought to have 
been completely assimilated by the Azerbaijanis.87 
In sum, the reality of intraethnic cultural segmentation defies categori-
zation and isolation based on geographic location-people might occupy 
the same geographic space and be members of the "same" ethnicity but not 
occupy the same cultural space. Cultural space can be delineated by, such 
markers as: differing clan membership, historic occupation,88 or group 
82. See id. at 120. 
83. See id. at 120-21. 
84. See Destexhe, supra note 71. 
85. The Sierra Leonean Creole ethnic group originated as a status category of "non-
natives"--ex-slaves from Jamaica, intercepted former captives who were formerly bound for 
the slave trade, and remnants of black poor relocated from England. This heterogeneous 
immigrant population metamorphosed into a status group because of their prominence in the 
British colonial administration of Sierra Leone. Creoles occupied colonial bureaucratic 
positions in far greater number than other Sierra Leonean groups. The final transition from 
a shared historical Creole status to full-blown ethnic identity occurred when Creole political 
organization and maneuvering in the 1970s resulted in Creole domination of the Sierra Le-
one an bureaucracy. Cohen, supra note 52, at 312-25. 
86. See Cheryl Rubenberg, Lebanon's Protracted Conflict: Causes and Consequences, in 
CONFLICT, MIGRATION AND THE EXPRESSION OF ETHNICITY 120-21 (Nancie L. Gonzalez & 
Carolyn S. McCommon eds., 1989). Much of the local Lebanese hostility to Palestinians 
arises from the utilization of the Palestinians as "the cheapest possible source of labor" 
which held down wages for poor Lebanese. 
87. See Mark R. Beissinger, The Relentless Pursuit of the National State, in GLOBAL 
CONVULSIONS, supra note 5, at 242. 
88. The Japanese Burakumin and the Indian "Untouchable" "classes" exemplify the 
process of political, economic and cultural stigmatization engendered by cultural biases re-
garding a group's historical occupation. 
The first fairly well-documented origins of caste in Japan can be traced to 
the development of occupational specialization in the ninth and tenth centu-
ries. . .. Japanese culture, under the influence of Buddhism brought in from 
China, depended on plant rather than animal foods and abhorred the ritual 
impurity of blood and death. . .. The growing popUlarity of Buddhism, with 
its strictures against taking life, helped to produce an outcast segment in the 
society composed of those communities specializing in such occupations as 
176 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:2 
histories. This dynamic was illustrated in Africa and Europe, for example, 
where various ethnicities shared the same political space accorded by 
trans-national political empires such as European imperial colonialism, the 
Ottoman Empire, or the Soviet Union. As history has shown, once the uni-
fying political hegemony of colonial or imperial control is lifted-ethnic 
identities burst forth from seemingly unitary lines. For example, post-
French BurundilRwanda left in its wake the current Huturrutsi conflict. 
Also, the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and Yugoslavia revealed 
the ethnocidal Serbo-Croatian-Bosnian Muslim struggles,89 and the end of 
the Soviet Union divided its people into several competing ethnic repub-
lics-each in tum threatened with secession by their own ethnic minori-
ties.90 Similarly, pre-existing cultural heterogeneity is masked by the broad 
label of "ethnicity" which might engender a false sense of cultural unity. 
Since culture is a contested plane of economic, political and social con-
cerns, ethnic elaborations on it likewise vary. 
II. TITLE VII'S "NATIONAL ORIGIN" CLASSIFICATION: 
GEOGRAPHY AND THE ILLUSORY MONOLITH OF CULTURE 
Unlike the "race" and "sex" protective categories of Title VII, the 
"national origin" category possesses scant legislative history and has ex-
perienced relatively little litigation.91 According to Professor Juan Perea, 
the term "national origin" appears to be an anti-discrimination 
"boilerplate" category imported into Title VII from earlier Executive Or-
ders and immigration statutes.92 Nevertheless, Title VII has evolved from 
its original conception as merely protecting against discrimination based 
slaughtering and processing of animal products. 
GEORGE DE VOS & HIROSHI WAGATSUMA, JAPAN'S INVISIBLE RACE: CASTE IN CULTURE AND 
PERSONALITY 14 (1966). Similarly, in India, the notion of "untouchability" may have its 
roots in Buddhism's birth in the subcontinent. The Buddhist principle of vegetarianism and 
non-killing engendered the ostracism of non-vegetarians and those engaged in occupations 
involving killing, slaughter and meat processing. See R.K. KSHIRSAGAR, UNTOUCHABILITY 
IN INDIA 35-37 (1986). "Ideas of purity, whether occupational or ceremonial, which are 
found to have been a factor in the genesis of [the Hindu caste system] are the very soul of 
the idea and practice of untouchability." G.S. GHURYE, CASTE, CLASS AND OCCUPATION 214 
(1961). 
89. See generally Robin Alison Remington, Ethnonationalism and the Disintegration of 
Yugoslavia, in GLOBAL CONVULSIONS, supra note 5, at 262. 
Id. 
The overarching problem is that both Croats and Serbs developed their na-
tional identities as non-state nations in the womb of competing empires .... 
[After centuries of separation, these former Yugoslav states] emerged from 
imperial domination divided by history, religion, arbitrary boundaries, ... 
and incompatible expectations in relation to their shared futures. 
90. See, e.g., Beissinger, supra note 87, at 227-46 (outlining possible explanations for 
the post-Soviet tendency of ethnic-based state fragmentation and autonomy movements). 
91. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has reviewed only one case centered on 
"national origin" discrimination. Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co., 414 U.S. 86, 86 
( 1973). 
92. Perea, supra note 18, at 810. 
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on the country of one's birth. It has been extended to protecting against 
discrimination based on the geographic origin of one's "ancestry." 
Moreover, current EEOC interpretive guidelines protect against discrimi-
nation arising from the physical, cultural, or linguistic characteristics or 
traits of national origin.93 In light of its evolution, "national origin" is 
based on an interpretive framework which predicates its protection against 
ethnic discrimination on geographic and monocultural assumptions. 
A. The Problematic Definition of "Nation": The Geographic Model 
According to its legislative history, "national origin" can have either of 
two narrow meanings: the individual's nation of birth or the nation(s) of 
birth of an individual's ancestors. 94 
As Congressperson James Roosevelt of California noted on the rec-
ord: "[m]ay I just make very clear that 'national origin' means national. It 
means the country from which your forbears came from. You may come 
from Poland, Czechoslovakia, England, France, or any other country. ,,95 
This statement points to defining "nation" as the geographic location a 
person comes from or an origin from a sovereign source. Indeed, early 
litigation regarding the meaning of the term "nation" in construing national 
origin protection arose over whether "nation" had a political statehood or 
sovereignty requirement.96 The courts have affirmatively ruled that there 
are no sovereignty requirements to the term "national origin.,,97 Neverthe-
less, in rejecting principles of political nationhood or sovereignty in defin-
ing "nation," the courts retain a fixation on geographic origins. 
In lanko v. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority98 the court noted that 
Gypsies have ancestral ties to "earlier nomadic minority tribal peoples in 
93. 29 C.F.R. § 1606 (1993). The EEOC guidelines provide for a wide array of physical 
and linguistic characteristics that may be protected under Title VII because the employment 
selection based on these characteristics may evince national origin discrimination. See id. at 
§§ 1606.6(a)(2) (height and weight as potentially protected national origin characteristics if 
requirements based on these characteristics disproportionately impact certain ethnic groups). 
See also id. at §§ 1606.7(a) (language and ethnic accent may be protectible characteristics if 
impacted by impermissibly motivated English fluency requirements). 
94. Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co., 414 U.S. 86,88 (1973). 
95. 110 Congo Rec. 2549 (1964) (emphasis added). 
96. See Pejic V. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 840 F.2d 667, 672-73 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(defendant argued that Serbian plaintiff failed to state a claim because Serbia did not consti-
tute a "nation" under Title VII purposes because it did not have political sovereignty at time 
of litigation). See also Roach V. Dresser, 494 F. Supp. 215, 217 (W.D. La 1980) (defendant 
argued that Acadians were not a protected "national origin" group since there was never a 
historic Acadian state). 
97. Indeed, as the court in Roach noted, "distinctions between citizens solely because of 
their ancestors are odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine 
of equality, and [thus] we decline to accept the argument that litigation of this sort should be 
governed by the principles of sovereignty." Roach, 494 F. Supp. at 218. 
98. 704 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
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the Caucasias. ,,99 This geographic link satisfied the "nation" component of 
national origin, despite the fact that Gypsies do not merely come from any 
one particular country but have ties to an ancestral home range "stretching 
from India to the northeastern, eastern, and southeastern boundaries of the 
Mediterranean."loo This case suggests that the component of "nation" in 
"national origin" is not limited to the singular and heretofore standard 
definition of "the country where one is from or one's ancestry is from.,,101 
Despite this innovation, lanko still requires some sort of geographic tie in 
according national origin protection. 
A similar geographic analysis is manifest in Roach v. Dresser102 where 
the court found that Acadians 103 are protected under Title VII's national 
origin protective category. In Roach, Defendant argued that since Acadia 
"is not and never was a country, plaintiff has no standing under Title VII" 
to claim national origin discrimination. 104 
The court concluded that since Acadians historically came from the 
former French colony of "Acadia," today's Nova Scotia, this geographic 
link is enough regardless of whether such territory ever possessed political 
sovereignty. lOS The court presented an in-depth historical elaboration on 
the Acadians' origin and forced exile from Acadia. That analysis served 
to establish the link between Acadians and a fixed geographic "homeland" 
so as to meet Title VII's requirement of a "country of origin." 106 
Nevertheless, protecting against culture-based discrimination (e.g., 
discriminating against someone based on their ethnicity) with a geography-
based model produces readily apparent problems. For example, as noted 
by Stephen Cutler, Title VII's national origin category, by narrowly focus-
ing on a person's geographic place of origin, fails to recognize the cultural 
differences among people who share the same geographic origin and/or an-
cestry.107 People from a specific country or ancestry may have differing 
99. Id. at 1532. 
100. Id. at 1531-32, citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1951). 
101. Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 88. 
102. 494 F. Supp. at 215. 
103. Popularly known as "Cajuns." Id. at 216. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 216-17. 
106. However, Roach also applied a culture-based approach in affording protection 
against discrimination based on Acadian identity. See infra notes 122-30 and accompany-
ing text. 
107. See Cutler, supra note 19, at 1164 ("Courts should consider the heterogeneity that 
exists within a single national origin group in their treatment of national origin cases under 
Title VII. Such an approach better achieves Title VII's goal of individual protection and 
eliminates the denigration of cultural identity implicit in today's enforcement of the stat-
ute.") While Cutler's focus regarding cultural heterogeneity revolves mostly around the 
question of intraethnic levels of acculturation to mainstream American culture, this Note 
frames cultural heterogeneity deeper. Title VII should recognize the fluid nature of culture 
within ethnicity. Ethnicities, being larger vehicles of cultural elaboration, fragment under 
the influence of external political, social and economic pressures. Only by recognizing this 
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levels of assimilation to the majority mainstream Anglo-American cul-
ture. 108 For example, recent arrivals may often exhibit more pronounced 
cultural traits from their native culture than those who share the same na-
tional origin or ancestry but have been in the United States much longer 
and thus are more acculturated and assimilated. 109 This higher visibility 
makes the less assimilated individuals more susceptible to discrimination 
than their more assimilated counterparts. Thus, within a national origin 
group, two members may share the same geographic origin but may occupy 
different cultural space-both within their estimation and in the estimation 
of the employers. In this situation, the purely geographic/ancestry-based 
anti-discrimination protective scheme fails-it does not protect the less 
assimilated individuals if the employer, in trying to mask its discriminatory 
intent, hires the more assimilated members of that national origin group. 
Hence, geographic location cannot be used as a shorthand or substitute for 
cultural location. 110 
Moreover, the judiciary's propensity to isolate geographic entities and 
ascribe cultural origins to these locations tends to confuse geographic 
space with cultural space. This confusion, possibly based on traditional 
views of "nationhood," equates one geographic and political entity ("the 
nation") with shared assumed homogenous characteristics such as, most 
notably, culture. llI Indeed, the fixed notion of culture as equivalent to na-
tionhood is still salient in cultural debate in the United States. 112 Yet, fa-
inherent nature of cultural evolution and affording protection accordingly can Title VII 
protect individuals from discrimination based on cultural changes and fissures occurring 
within seemingly unitary ethnic groupings. 
108. See Cutler, supra note 19, at 1165. 
109. See id. 
110. See id. 
111. See, e.g., Porter, supra note 5, at 103-12 (noting the transition from "state" national-
ism to nationalism based on ethnicity-"Ethnonationalism"). 
112. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Who May Give Birth to United States Citizens?, 17 
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REp. 275, 276 (1996) (observing that the American identity has never 
been a concept free of the cultural factors of race-indeed, the traditional hegemonic idea of 
American national identity revolves around the "idea that American culture is white peo-
ple's culture." Roberts notes that these are the cultural propositions that underide the cur-
rent drive to abolish the Fourteenth Amendment's automatic conferral of American citizen-
ship to babies born in the U.S.) Id. See also Francis Fukuyama, Culture Vulture, NAT'L 
REV., May 1, 1995, at 77 (reviewing PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE 
ABOUT AMERICA'S IMMIGRATION DISASTER (1995)). Fukuyama asserts, 
the common American culture ... is actually a sectarian Protestant Anglo-
Saxon culture that was somehow detached from its ethnic roots, mixed with 
universalistic Lockean-liberal principles, and adopted by the non-Anglo-
Saxon, non-Protestant immigrants from Europe who arrived subsequently, 
and who then intermarried to such an extent that it is no longer meaningful 
to try to determine what proportion of the country is descended from Ital-
ians, Swedes, and the like. 
/d. Nevertheless, American culture is still deemed as operating from one fixed cultural 
proposition (and its cultural assumptions and other implied "baggage")-White Anglo 
Saxon Protestantism. [d. Roberts just chose not to mince words . 
........ --------------------------------------
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cially solid geo-political lines may conceal serious ethnic animosity under 
its illusory veil of solidarity. 113 The current Title VII geo-centered ap-
proach seems to confuse political nationhood with ethnic or cultural na-
tionhood. 114 
B. Beyond National Origin: Beyond the Implication of Cultural 
Monolithism 
Title VII is also ineffective because it is oblivious to the existence of 
different cultures within a geopolitical grouping. I label this tendency to 
equate one culture with one common country of origin as "cultural mono-
lithism." As Stephen Cutler notes, Title VII's geographic orientation im-
plicitly assumes cultural unity among individuals sharing the same country 
of origin or ancestry115 and ignores cultural differences between individu-
als who share the same geographic origin. Hence, an individual employer 
can escape claims of anti-Filipino bias by hiring a Filipino-American de-
scended from an earlier wave of Filipino immigrants as opposed to another 
Filipino who recently immigrated to the United States. 116 By allowing an 
employer to do this, Title VII equates geographic/ancestral commonality 
with cultural commonality. 
Even if Title VII were to include statutory language explicitly protect-
ing against ethnic discrimination, this alone may not be sufficient to over-
come the cultural monolithism inherent in Title VII's current geographic 
orientation. In this structure, just as Title VII equates one culture to one 
geographic space, it may just as automatically ascribe one culture to one 
ethnic group-in complete disregard to the cultural heterogeneity that may 
be present within. For example, in De Volid v. Bailar, 117 the Fifth Circuit 
summarily dismissed a Mexican-American's claim of national origin dis-
crimination where the Civil Service promotion she sought went to another 
Mexican American employee. "Whatever motives the Civil Service 
Commission may have had in choosing between two people of the same 
ethnic origin," the court concluded, "discrimination cannot have been 
among them.,,118 Apparently ignoring the possibility of cultural divisions 
113. See, e.g., Beissinger, supra note 87, at 227-46 (outlining the dynamics of resource 
competition among ethnic groups as a driving force in the breakup of the Soviet Union into 
ethnic republics). 
114. The difference between these two conceptions of "nation" is profound. See, e.g., 
Porter, supra note 5, at 103-12. 
115. See Cutler, supra note 19, at 1165 (arguing that mere commonality of place of origin 
does not protect individuals from discrimination based on how closely one retains an ethnic 
identity as manifested by perceptible ethnic traits). 
116. Early large-scale Filipino migration to the United States involved mostly agricultural 
workers concentrating in Hawaii and California. See VINCENT N. PARRILLO, STRANGERS TO 
THESE SHORES: RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 293-94 (1994). 
117. De Vond v. Bailar, 568 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1978). 
118. [d. at 1164. 
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and heterogeneity in the Mexican-American ethnic community, the court 
stated, "any unfairness in the choice between the plaintiff and (the promo-
tion recipient) cannot have had its source in discrimination based on na-
tional origin, this being so, there is no Title VII action.,,1l9 
The current system allows an employer who is not of the same ethnic-
ity as the applicant to evade a claim of national origin discrimination by 
hiring someone from the rejected applicant's ethnic group. Additionally, 
the employer can discriminate on intraethnic grounds by looking at the 
distinctions within an ethnic group and making a value judgment as to who 
possesses traits that are more "American,,12o or stereotyped as more desir-
able (i.e., in consonance with American values).121 Most importantly, the 
employer, if privy to the internal cultural stereotypes of a particular ethnic 
group, can use these stereotypes in assessing fitness for employment be-
tween seemingly similar members of a particular ethnic group. Hence, an 
employer can refuse to hire an applicant because the latter does not fit the 
employer's stereotype of the applicant's ethnic group or belongs to a sub-
group within the same ethnic group which is stereotyped with lower 
status. 122 Under both scenarios, Title Vll's flawed assumptions regarding 
the power and nature of "culture" allow employers to "fly under the radar" 
of Title Vll protection. 123 Furthermore, the current inadequacy in the con-
struction of "national origin" protection leaves Title Vll's purpose and 
policy unfulfilled. 124 
119. [d. 
120. See Cutler, supra note 19, at 1165. 
!d. 
Even the employer whose animus is directed at ancestral origin per se might 
rely upon national origin-linked characteristics to give effects to his feelings. 
. .. An employer prejudiced against an ancestral origin per se who is forced 
to choose among applicants of that origin may well rely on distinctively for-
eign characteristics in more than an administrative way. Given a choice 
between two equally qualified Americans of Mexican ancestry, the employer 
would probably favor (perhaps consciously and perhaps not) the one who 
was more assimilated. 
121. [d. 
122. This situation is similar to Reeb v. Marshall, 626 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1980), a sexual 
discrimination case where a female employee was terminated because of her failure to con-
form to her supervisor's stereotype of a professional woman. However, in that context, the 
court held that the employee's failure to live up to an employer's gender stereotype gives 
rise to a sex discrimination action under Title VII. [d. 
123. This situation is analogous to Stephen Cutler's observations of "trait-based" dis-
crimination: the intentional discrimination by an employer among applicants of the same 
ethnic group as to who is "more acculturated." Cutler, supra note 19, at 1165 (observing 
that this practice is often apparent if an employer offers the hiring of a member of a specific 
national group to rebut or preclude an inference of discriminatory motive with respect to a 
failure to hire another applicant from the same national origin group as the successful appli-
cant). Such a selection process results in "forced invisibility" of those who do not fit the 
employer's preference for "more American." 
124. Indeed, the very idea of anti-discrimination laws is to prevent discrimination of indi-
viduals based on improper selective criteria. These criteria are often developed from 
P7"'t:N?f 
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III. TOWARDS A CULTURE-BASED "NATIONAL ORIGIN" 
JURISPRUDENCE: MOVING BEYOND THE CONFINES OF 
GEOGRAPHY AND CULTURAL MONOLITHIC MYOPIA 
In accordance with both Stephen Cutler and Professor Juan Perea's ar-
guments, current EEOC interpretive guidelines 125 should explicitly allow a 
plaintiff to file a Title VII cause of action even if an employer chooses an 
applicant of the same national origin as a rejected applicant. Similarly, if 
Title VII is amended to include "ethnicity" and/or "ethnic traits," the 
EEOC interpretive guidelines should provide that a cause of action still lies 
even if the applicants share the same ethnicity. This Note proposes that the 
analysis required to effectuate such protection can be gleaned from Roach 
v. Dresser. 126. 
Although Roach involved an analysis of the historical formation of the 
"Acadian" or "Cajun" ethnicity, it still provides a viable framework for 
establishing the existence, and thereby protection, of an intraethnic cultural 
group for Title VII purposes. Roach focused on objective historical evi-
dence that fell within two general headings: political history and cultural 
history. Under its political analysis, Roach chronicled the original French 
migration to the region that later became "Acadia" and traced the subse-
quent changing political fortunes of these people and their descendants. 127 
This objective frame of reference focused on historical pressures, such as 
military occupation, exile and war,128 attendant to both the formation and 
f . f I 129 ragmentatIon 0 cu ture. 
stereotypes of the group. The presence of others of same ethnicity and group at the em-
ployer's establishment is only one factor in determining if there was illegal discrimination. 
110 CONGo REC. 7213 (1964). 
125. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text. 
126. 494 F. Supp. 215 (W.D. La. 1980). 
127. See id. at 217. The court relates that the original French colonization of Acadia is 
subsequently marked by a political contest between the British and the French. As a result, 
the colonial territory of Acadia shifted back and forth between France and England resulting 
in French exile for many Acadians. Upon Spanish invitation, many of the exiled Acadians 
who fled to France returned to Spain's North American colony of Louisiana in 1764. 
128. For example, the Babylonian exile, far from destroying Judaic culture and identity, 
distilled and encouraged cultural retention. 
The unwilling emigrants had accordingly retained their ethnic, their linguis-
tic, and their religious identity ... To comfort themselves for the loss of 
their country, they began to study this rich literature [Mosaic law and Dad-
vidic poetry] with increased affection, sifting it, arranging it, copying it, and 
perhaps reading aloud when they carne together. Worship ... took the place 
of sacrifice, and prayer-meetings, at which the ancient literature was read 
and discussed. 
CECIL ROTH, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE 52 (3d. ed. 1948). 
129. See Volpp, supra note 16, at 1586. In this case, cultural formation arises from the 
interaction between the differing cultural forces inherent behind the political clash over 
Acadia. As Acadia switched hands between the French and the English, Scots and English 
settlers entered the region. However, "[A]n Irishman or Scot who moved to the colony of 
Nova Scotia [originally Acadia] would, after several years, take on the identity of the 
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Roach's cultural analysis focuses on the historical point at which self-
identification and cultural genesis emerge: "[a]lthough they spoke French, 
they had developed new customs, and by 1700 the descendants of the first 
settlers of Acadia considered themselves to be a new people-the Acadi-
ans.,,130 Moreover, the court looked at the Acadians' internal notions of 
determining group membership---"[t]hey considered themselves to be 
Acadians as long as they had been born and raised in that colony.,,131 Al-
though cultural self-identification can be a purely subjective realization, 
the court appears to produce an objective verification of this realization 
through its use of a historical time frame. 
The perception of the Acadians by the British, cultural outsiders, was 
another key element to Roach's cultural analysis. The political and colo-
nial relationship between the two peoples colored British perceptions of 
the Acadians. The latter were looked on with distrust because they refused 
to bear arms against France in 1720 and 1726.132 British anxiety over the 
Acadians' refusal to sign an unconditional oath of allegiance to England 
generated British reprisals resulting in the confiscation of all Acadian 
property, followed by deportation. 133 The court verifies the British view of 
the Acadians as cultural "Others" through documented historical events 
manifesting this perception. 
Roach's methodology is of particular relevance in the intraethnic con-
text because it isolates the historical/political/economic pressures that pro-
duce cultural schisms within a seemingly "unitary" ethnic groUp.134 This 
method also clearly lays out the kind of objective historical requirements 
for proving cultural schisms. Interpretive guidelines that seek to reorient 
Title vn to protect against intraethnic discrimination should focus on three 
conjunctive factors: subjective group self-perception, historical corrobora-
tion and objective group perception. 
Due to judicial efficiency and economy concerns, the courts should re-
quire historical material from which they can determine group identifica-
tion. 135 The plaintiff claiming intraethnic group discrimination must be 
Acadians." Roach, 494 F. Supp. at 217. 
130. Id. (Emphasis added). 
131. Id. 
132. See id. 
133. See id. 
134. Although Roach is one of the clearest in employing the historical analysis approach 
to determining cultural divisions, other court decisions employ a similar historical model in 
establishing ethnic "national origin groups." See, e.g., Pejic v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 
840 F.2d 667,672-73 (9th Cir. 1988) (tracing the history of Serbo-Croatian animosity and 
the changing historic and political fortunes of the Serbian people). 
135. This requirement is in acknowledgment of the conservative nature of law which de-
mands predictive values for its objects. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the 
Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457 (1897), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES 160 (Richard Posner ed., 
1992) ("The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the 
public force through the instrumentality of the courts."). 
c= 
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able to point to verifiable historical facts that would support intraethnic 
distinction due to cultural fissures within the "single ethnicity" she shares 
with the employee selected for employment over her. 136 
To prevail in a disparate treatment claim once the plaintiff has estab-
lished her intraethnic group identity, she must establish that the employer 
based her discriminatory action on intraethnic difference. It is irrelevant 
whether the employer's perception of the plaintiff's intraethnic difference 
is accurate. 137 The court's analysis must recognize that it is the perception 
of "differentness" which leads to the ascription of stereotypes regardless of 
its accuracy. Likewise, for the employer to assert that she misidentified 
the plaintiff's actual intraethnic grouping is not an acceptable defense in an 
analysis of intraethnic discrimination. 138 
IV. POLICY RATIONALES BEHIND A NEW INTERPRETIVE 
GUIDELINE 
The guiding philosophy behind Title VII protection is to prevent the 
denial of employment benefits to an individual because of arbitrary rea-
sons-such as race, national origin, color, gender, or religion-that are not 
correlated to an individual's particular value as an employee. 139 Indeed, it 
has been argued that arbitrary and selective decision-making based on 
these grounds is immoral. 140 Moreover, Title VII's policy of rooting out 
136. For example, historical records of animosity by the majority intraethnic group against 
the minority is of great help in determining the existence of protectible cultural divisions. 
However, this should not be read as requiring a record of actual intraethnic warfare. A his-
toric record establishing an outside perception of the claimed intraethnic group as 
"different" is enough. Requiring actual ethnic warfare or conflict to "corroborate" cultural 
differences may be unrealistic and unavailing since cultural differences and antagonism 
might not have ripened enough to full-blown physical violence. Intraethnic differences 
should be all that is needed because it is on these differences, perceived by the cultural 
groups themselves, that the whole complex of traits of in-group and out-group cultural dy-
namics are ascribed. 
137. See, e.g., Perkins v. Lake County Dept of Utilities, 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1277 (N.D. 
Ohio 1994) (In a case where employer perceived African-American plaintiff as a Native 
American and discriminated against the plaintiff on this basis, the court determined that the 
plaintiff established his membership in a racial protective category not by "verifying" his 
"actual" race, but by exploring the employer's perceptions of the claimant. The court held 
that it is the employer's reasonable belief that a given employee is a member of a protected 
class that controls the issue of whether the plaintiff is indeed a member of that protected 
class.). 
138. See id. 
139. "Indeed, the very purpose of Title VII is to promote hiring on the basis of job qualifi-
cations, rather than on the basis of race or color." 110 CONGo REc. 7247 (1964). See also 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) ("[Title VII seeks the] removal of ar-
tificial and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to dis-
criminate on the basis of ... impermissible classifications."); Franks v. Bowman Transp. 
Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (Congress' intent was to prohibit all practices which create ine-
quality in employment due to race, religion, sex, or national origin classifications). 
140. See Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong: Biases, Prefer-
ences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 159 (1992) (arguing that "when a 
¥6 
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arbitrary and invidious standards must not be defeated by the mere fact that 
the biases in forming this discrimination stem from a panoply of social 
meanings and symbols imported from another country.14l Perhaps it is be-
cause of the "foreignness" of these social meanings and boundaries that 
intraethnic discrimination is by and large imperceptible to the American 
mainstream culture. Yet while intraethnic discrimination may seem in-
visible, its hidden nature does not lessen the pain, humiliation and depri-
vation of its victims. 142 
It would be a perverse irony if Title VII were to be read to allow the 
same proscribed discrimination if it is inflicted between members of the 
same ethnic group or if Anglo employers were to discriminate within an 
h . b . h 143 et mc group ut escape pums ment. 
person is judged incorrectly to be of lesser moral worth and is treated accordingly, that 
treatment is morally wrong regardless of the gravity of its effects. It represents a failure to 
show the moral respect due the recipient a failure which is by itself sufficient to be judged 
immoral."). 
141. Political and cultural control flows from the intraethnic "superior" group's monopoli-
zation of cultural portrayal of subject group. Indeed, the ability of one group to impose its 
cultural portrayals onto another is a testament to this cultural hegemony. This process can 
be analogized to the European colonial experience which involved constructing a primitive 
"other" which allowed the "West" to define a contrasting identity as "progressive," which 
was then used to justify colonialism and imperialism. See generally EDWARD W. SAID, 
ORIENTALISM (1978) (explaining how the creation of "the Orient" in European discourse 
and imagination supported European imperialist domination). 
142. For a fascinating discussion on how foreign corporations import their capital and 
their cultural biases into the U.S., see William H. Lash, Unwelcome Imports: Racism, Sex-
ism, and Foreign Investment, 13 MICH. J. OFINT'LLAw 1, 3-28 (1991). 
143. Just as anomalous gaps in Title VII's national origin protection scheme leaves space 
for employers to discriminate "under cover of law" a disparate impact analysis under the 
current national origin scheme allows for a perverse evasion of the law. Since intraethnic 
subgroups are not accorded national origin protection, the discriminating employer can al-
ways evade disparate impact liability by hiring members of the ethnic group without the un-
desired traits. For example: an employer versed in the cultural stereotypes among regional 
ethnic subgroups in the Philippines decides to hire only Cebuanos. An Ilocano denied em-
ployment cannot file a claim under disparate impact because this claim is restricted to dispa-
rate impact against Filipinos. The employer will just count the Cebuanos he hired and as-
suming that it matches the 80% EEOC parity guidelines for disparate impact, escape 
liability. The law looks only as to how many Filipinos, in which Cebuanos and Ilokanos are 
intraethnic subgroups, under the current national origin jurisprudence. This interpretive 
scheme works an injustice to and commits violence on the purposes underlying Title VII. 
Although current national origin jurisprudence has never recognized the disparate 
impact claim of an intraethnic group, the Supreme Court's reasoning in Connecticut v. Teal, 
457 U.S. 440 (1982) implicitly supports such a claim. The Court denied Connecticut's as-
sertion that the "bottom line" numbers of its selection process-the proportional represen-
tation of blacks among promotion recipients-immunized it from liability for the adverse 
impact of a particular promotion criterion. The Court held that the overall proportionality 
of Connecticut's selection process could not vindicate the use of non-job-related test which 
eliminated a subgroup of black individuals from the promotion competition. As Stephen 
Cutler notes, "[a] proportional outcome should not be allowed to mask the discriminatory 
impact of even one selection criterion upon a subgroup of individuals defined by their pos-
session of group linked characteristics." Cutler, supra note 19, at 1772 (emphasis added). 
Although Cutler's article deals mostly with discrimination based on "ethnicity-linked" traits 
fiEff 
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Intraethnic discrimination produces the same harms that arise from 
ethnic and racial discrimination: stigmatization, forced assimilation and 
denial of cultural expression. The process of stigmatization refers to the 
injury a group and its individual members sustain when an individual's 
conduct implicitly renders a group as inferior. 144 The stigmatization of 
being a cultural "other," even within one's own ethnic and/or national ori-
gin grouping, results in an individual's loss of status that often follows a 
self-perpetuating pattern. Just because the perpetrator of the "invidious" 
and "arbitrary barrier" of employment discrimination and his victim share 
the same ethnicity does not compel an abandonment of Title VII's com-
mand for equality of opportunity. 
Moreover, intraethnic discrimination forces intraethnic group members 
to assimilate either into American culture or into their ethnic group's ma-
jority culture. Ignoring intraethnic discrimination involves the same dy-
namics as that of imposing an illusory sense of cultural unity between cul-
tural groups that are at the point of division and fission. The current 
framework for national origin protection encourages an illusory impression 
of ethnic and cultural unity within one sovereign border. 145 The same 
problem is inherent in looking at a seemingly unified ethnic group and 
falsely assuming ethnic unity. By forcing members of intraethnic groups 
into subscribing to the "official" or "accepted" cultural traits of their own 
group current Title VII national origin jurisprudence is forcing individuals 
such as level of assimilation and English proficiency, his analysis has special relevance re-
garding disparate impact analysis for intraethnic discrimination. The Cutler article dealt 
solely with differing traits within an ethnic group rather than differing cultural subgroups of 
a singularly regarded ethnic group. 
144. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880) (stating that that a statute pro-
hibiting blacks from serving on juries was "practically a brand upon them[,] ... an assertion 
of their inferiority .... "). 
145. A seminal example is Pejic v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 840 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 
1988), which involved the defendant's claim that since the plaintiff's claimed national ori-
gin, Serbian, is incorporated within what was Yugoslavia plaintiff has not stated a cause of 
action. Although the court resolved this issue by ruling that since Serbia once possessed 
sovereignty, the fact that its borders were completely absorbed by Yugoslavia does not 
constitute a failure to state a national origin claim ("Given world history, Title VII cannot be 
read to limit 'countries' to those with modern boundaries, or to require their existence for a 
certain time length before it will prohibit discrimination. Animus based on national origin 
can persist long after new political structures and boundaries are established. "). In the in-
traethnic discrimination context, an individual cannot point to cultural divisions which are 
roughly mirrored by differing political or national boundaries from other ethnic groups. In 
the intraethnic discrimination context, the individual is left with pointing to a unified sov-
ereign border and convincing an incredulous judge that there are cultural divisions within 
that unified sovereign facade that threatens to erupt. It is ominous that in Pejic, the plain-
tiff's claim of Serbian instead of Yugoslavian national origin membership portended and 
reflected the interethnic strife and fissure within Yugoslavia that culminated in its destruc-
tion as a unified political entity in 1991. Chuck Sudetic, Yugoslavia Breakup Gains Mo-
mentum, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1991, at 3. See also Marshall Tyler, Dirty, Stubborn War, 
DES MOINES REGISTER, Dec. 11, 1994, at 1. 
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to hide their cultural differences. 146 Moreover, by condoning the discrimi-
natory employment practice of hiring more "acculturated" individuals 
within the same ethnic group, Title VII allows forced assimilation into the 
"American melting-pot." However, as observed by Justice Douglas, "[t]he 
melting pot is not designed to homogenize people, making them uniform in 
consistency. . .. [Rather, it] depicts the wide diversities tolerated ... un-
der one flag." 147 Extending Title VII national origin protection to remedy 
intraethnic discrimination will serve this important value: cultural plural-
ism and tolerance. 
146. This process goes against the dynamic of culture as "contested" ten"ain. 
147. Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312,334 (1974) (Douglas, 1. dissenting). 
